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WE THE PEOPLE: EACH AND EVERY ONE
RANDY E. BARNETT *

ABSTRACT: In his book series, We the People, Bruce Ackerman offers a rich
description of how constitutional law comes to be changed by social movements.
He also makes some normative claims about “popular sovereignty,” “popular
consent,” “higher law,” and “higher-lawmaking.” In this essay, I examine these
claims and find them to be both highly under-theorized and deeply problematic.
Ackerman’s own presentation of what he considers to be an informal process of
constitutional amendment illustrates the importance of formality in protecting the
rights retained by the people. And he assumes a collective conception of popular
sovereignty without considering the serious normative problems raised by
majority and supermajority rule. Rule by a majority or supermajority is not the
answer to the problem of constitutional legitimacy; it is the problem that requires
a normative solution. As an alternative to collective or majoritarian conceptions
of popular sovereignty, I identify an individualist conception that yields
fundamentally different conclusions about the purpose of a written constitution,
including the importance of written amendments in safeguarding the rights
retained by a sovereign people, each and every one. Finally, in a Postscript I
respond to Professor Ackerman’s reply to this essay.
INTRODUCTION
“We the People” is a powerful trope—so powerful that it has propelled three
books of that title by the distinguished Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman, with
a fourth and final one on the way. In this series, Ackerman has presented a novel
thesis. We the People can amend the written Constitution by means other than
those provided by Article V and, what’s more, the People have done so more than
once. The first amendment took place during the New Deal in the 1930s and 40s,
and the second during the Second Reconstruction in the 1950s and 60s.
By this maneuver, Ackerman does not challenge head-on the method of
constitutional interpretation known today as “originalism,” which specifies simply
*
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that the meaning of the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly
changed. Not only does he accept the original meaning of the text of the
Constitution as enacted, he claims the title of “originalist” for himself. “Scalia and
Thomas call themselves ‘originalists,’” he writes, “but they are wrong in doing so.
I am the originalist, not they.” 1 He thinks he can do this because the text of the
Constitution has supposedly been properly amended outside of Article V through
exercises of so-called “popular sovereignty,” ratifying a deviation from the
original text. He then can claim to be adhering to the original meaning of the
Constitution as amended more faithfully than those who today call themselves
originalists.
Ackerman’s three books can be read at two levels. The first is a deeply
insightful description of how constitutional law has changed since the Founding,
and why. They present a richly detailed story of the mechanisms by which the
Supreme Court eventually bends to the demands of social movements and
changes its doctrines to accommodate legislation that the Court would previously
have deemed unconstitutional. Ackerman provides an incisive explanation of how
constitutional law came to accommodate the exercise of legislative power, both
state and federal, formerly considered at odds with the Constitution’s text.
Continually shadowing the level of description and explanation, however, is
another level of normativity and legitimacy. Ackerman persistently claims more
than to be presenting an accurate and informative narrative of the evolution of
constitutional law; he justifies this evolution as a normatively legitimate
expression of “popular sovereignty.” On his account, “We the People” have
properly amended the text of the written Constitution through a complex
interaction of the Congress, President, and Supreme Court, ratified by elections.
With Volume 3, we are now told that this process is not only complex, it is also
highly variable, as no two informal constitutional amendments are made in quite
the same manner. After describing these varying mechanisms, he then proposes
his interpretation of the true “original” meaning of these unwritten constitutional
amendments.
One can accept Ackerman’s series on one of these two levels without
accepting it at the other. One can learn much from his marvelous narrative of the
evolution of constitutional law without being persuaded by his effort to justify it
as legitimate constitutional change. In this essay, I will not challenge his story
and, for present purposes, will grant its accuracy. Instead, I will challenge his
1
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normative claim that changes in constitutional law have effected a legitimate
amendment to the Constitution itself. While its lack of theoretical specificity is
enough to find it unpersuasive, I will do more. I will also identify an alternative
conception of popular sovereignty that explains why Ackerman’s appeal to “We
the People” is misplaced.
I. ACKERMAN’S UNDERSPECIFIED NORMATIVE CLAIM
“We the People” appears sixty-four times in the text of We the People: The
Civil Rights Revolution. “Popular sovereignty” appears fifty-eight times. “Popular
consent” appears seven times. 2 The phrases “higher law” or “higher lawmaking”
appear twenty-four times. Given the centrality of these concepts to the title and
thesis of the book, one would expect they would be carefully defined. Indeed,
offering a definition would seem to be the least that a theory of legitimate
constitutional change must deliver before advancing a normative claim. Yet,
because none of these phrases is defined, we are left to piece together their
meanings.
We can start with this passage early in the book that utilizes all four phrases:
Popular sovereignty isn’t a myth. The Founders developed a distinctive form of
constitutional practice which successfully gave ordinary (white male) Americans
a sense that they made a real difference in determining their political future. This
Founding success established paradigms for legitimate acts of higher-lawmaking
that subsequent generations have developed further. Reconstruction
Republicans, New Deal Democrats, and the Civil Rights leadership once again
confronted the task of winning broad and self-conscious popular consent for
their sweeping transformations of the constitutional status quo—and each time,
they (more or less) succeeded. The challenge is to analyze the concrete ways in
which the evolving constitutional system tested their claims by requiring them to
return repeatedly to the voters to earn the very special authority required to
create a new regime in the name of We the People. 3

It is difficult enough to claim popular consent to rule; it is exponentially more
difficult to claim “the very special authority required to create a new regime.” In
We the People: Foundations, Ackerman does explicate the claim of constitutional
revolutionaries to supplant one regime by another, even if doing so was outside

2
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the formal rules of the previous regime. 4 But this is an entirely different matter
than claiming that the formal mechanisms for amending the regime can be
ignored while professing to remain within it.
In this regard, the precise nature of Ackerman’s claims throughout the three
volumes is ambiguous. On the one hand, he quite clearly claims that the adoption
of the Republicans’ Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments was as genuinely a
revolutionary regime change as the replacement of the Articles of Confederation
with the Federalists’ new Constitution. To this end, like others today and
Democrats back then, he has emphasized the “unconventional” or illegal nature of
the ratification processes for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. 5 This
move is in service of his contention that the “New Deal Revolution” represented a
revolutionary regime change in this sense. Presumably, so too was the “Civil
Rights Revolution” (though I did not find this claim quite so clearly presented in
Volume Three).
On the other hand, a more moderate claim also seems to pervade the work:
that the formal amendment procedures of Article V were themselves informally
amended by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and that this new informal amendment
process of “higher-law making” was utilized again during the New Deal and
Second Reconstruction. According to this claim, the regime was not replaced by
an extra-legal revolution, as the regime governed by Articles of Confederation
was supplanted by a new regime governed by the Constitution. Instead, the
existing regime was simply informally amended or modified, as the Republicans
had innovated in the nineteenth century while otherwise remaining within it.
Indeed, to the extent that the Republicans had merely amended the amendment
process of Article V, there is nothing particularly “revolutionary” about later
using the new informal process of constitutional amendment to make further
changes.
So which is it? Have we had four “regimes” since the Articles of
Confederation, like the French have had five republics? 6 Or did the Republicans
4

See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 169-179 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing the theory of constitutional revolution identified in The
Federalist).
5
See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 141-150 (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (discussing the “unconventional” ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment); id. at 230-32 (describing Congress’ “blatant[]” refusal to respect the structure of
Article V).
6
See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 34 (characterizing as a “Bicentennial Myth” that
“the French have run through five republics since 1789,” while “we have lived in only one”).
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in the Thirty-Ninth Congress merely informally amend Article V to allow for
further informal amendments to the existing regime? It makes a difference, for
one can hardly claim that the American people have “self-consciously” 7 engaged
in the higher-lawmaking of replacing one regime with another if the fact of
regime change was kept from them. Unlike the Founding, when the revolutionary
nature of the change was made clear by Congress’s referring the matter to
conventions in the states, this was never the claim made on behalf of these later
changes at the time they were being debated.
On the other hand, to make out the more modest claim that the New Deal and
Second Reconstruction marked changes to constitutional law akin to the formal
amendments achieved by the Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
Ackerman merely needs to show that, under the amended amendment procedures,
a super-majority of the American people have yet again informally amended the
Constitution rather than replaced regimes. For all the talk of revolution, this far
more modest claim seems to do much of the work in his narrative.
With this in mind, let us stipulate that Ackerman is trying to mimic the supermajoritarian requirements of Article V with other super-majoritarian procedures
of higher-lawmaking. Of course, the principal objection to Article V is that its
procedures are too onerous to keep the Constitution in tune with the exigencies of
the times. 8 For this reason, Ackerman desires a lesser level of popular support;
otherwise he would be content with Article V as written. Yet, while he insists that
mere majoritarian sentiment cannot suffice as “higher-lawmaking,” the
appropriate quantity and composition of super-majoritarian support for legitimate
regime change is never specified.
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it specifies the
super-majority it requires for changing the Constitution, so everyone knows the
threshold in advance.
***

7

See infra note 9 (identifying where Ackerman claims that higher-lawmaking must be “selfconscious”).
8
This may well be true, in which case, for reasons I will make clearer in what follows, the solution
is to modify the amendment procedures in writing. The issue here is not whether to make the
process of amending the Constitution easier, but whether the text of the written Constitution
should be amended informally.
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In the passage just quoted, Ackerman also says that “popular consent” to
“sweeping transformations of the constitutional status quo” must be “selfconscious.” 9 In other words, the requisite supermajority must know they are
changing the Constitution when they vote, say, for FDR, LBJ, or for their Senator
or Representative who then “ratifies” the vision of these Presidents by voting for
what Ackerman calls “landmark statutes” 10 or “super-statutes.” 11 Sometimes,
however, he changes who must self-consciously assent, 12 and to what. 13 How
seriously can we take these normative claims for “the very special authority
9

Ackerman repeatedly insists on the “self-conscious” nature of popular consent to constitutional
change. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (“We the People followed
Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats step-by-step as they built new systems of
popular sovereignty to win broad and self-conscious popular support for their transformative
initiatives.”); id. at 11 (“[T]he President and Congress, with the critical assistance of Martin
Luther King . . . self-consciously repudiated the idea that Article Five should monopolize higher
lawmaking—choosing instead to use their landmark statute to function as an engine of
constitutional change in the name of the American people.”); id. at 28 (“Since the Civil War,
[Americans] have given decisive and self-conscious support to national politicians and their
judicial appointees to redefine constitutional values through landmark statutes and superprecedents.”); id. at 320-21 (“[T]he Court, Congress and the Presidency worked with one another
to express the self-conscious decision by ordinary Americans to move the Second Reconstruction
far beyond the constitutional principles of the nineteenth century.”); id. at 330 (contending that, in
Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts “struck down a key provision of the Voting Rights Act . . .
without even noticing that the American people . . . self-consciously repudiated the application of
his asserted principle to voting rights.”).
10
See id. at 33-34 (“Though the notion of a superprecedent has become familiar, we have not yet
begun to consider seriously whether landmark statutes also deserve a central place in the modern
constitutional canon. This will be a central thesis of this book.”); id. at 34 (proposing to “grant full
constitutional status to the landmark statutes of the civil rights revolution”).
11
Ackerman borrows the term “super-statute” from WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010). See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 34.
12
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 92 (“Congress . . . self-consciously
displac[ed] Article Five with the modern higher lawmaking system based on landmark statutes and
judicial super-precedents.” (emphasis added)); id. at 119 (“The civil rights leadership . . . selfconsciously assert[ed] Congressional authority to use the Voting Rights Act as a substitute for a
constitutional amendment.” (emphasis added)); id. at 329 (“Martin Luther King Jr. and a
bipartisan political leadership self-consciously designed alternative methods for constitutional
revision.” (emphasis added)).
13
See, e.g., id. at 61 (“[T]he American people gave their sustained and self-conscious consent to a
series of landmark statutes marking an egalitarian breakthrough.” (emphasis added)); id. at 202
(reporting that President Johnson “was prepared to provoke a ‘bitter civil rights fight’ to gain the
broad and self-conscious support of the American people for another landmark statute” (emphasis
added)).
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required to create a new regime” 14 when their content is so woefully
underspecified?
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it clearly puts
everyone, including members of Congress and the general public, on notice that a
modification of the constitutional “regime” is on offer.
***
To the indeterminacy of the signal that a constitutional amendment is on offer,
we can add the indeterminacy of the substance of the higher law that the People
have supposedly ratified at a “constitutional moment.” 15 In the end, it falls to,
well, Bruce Ackerman to tell us what happened. That is the lesson of Ackerman’s
sustained criticism of the lawyers’ received wisdom of the meaning of Brown v.
Board of Education. He urges the “future generations [to] lift their eyes beyond
the United States Reports to hear spokesmen for the people such as Lyndon
Johnson and Martin Luther King Jr., Hubert Humphrey and Everett
Dirksen . . . .” 16 Future scholars should “reflect[] on their achievements” instead
of “cast[ing] these leaders as tired epigones living off the constitutional heritage
left by the giants of an ever-receding past.” 17
In other words, on Ackerman’s theory, the true constitutional meaning of the
Second Reconstruction is what he urges in his book despite a lack of recognition
even by legal professionals, much less the general public. How “self-conscious”
can this constitutional transformation be if, fifty years on, specialists in
constitutional law are unaware it happened?
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it clearly informs
everyone of the terms of a constitutional change actually adopted.
***
Then there is the shifting mechanism of constitutional change. At least with
his account of the New Deal, Ackerman seemed to present a recognizable—and
presumably repeatable—process of presidential initiative, approved by an
14

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
A phrase Ackerman made famous in his earlier volumes, which is used fourteen times in his
latest.
16
Id. at 316.
17
Id.
15
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overwhelming proportion of Congress, and ratified by successive elections. Yet
now we are told that “history never repeats itself—and the civil rights path toward
popular sovereignty differed from the New Deal in key respects.” 18 Sometimes
change is initiated by the President, sometimes by the Court, and sometimes by
Congress. Ackerman’s theory molds itself to fit the facts of any “constitutional
moment” he proposes.
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it is specific about
the alternative procedures by which constitutional amendments may be proposed
and ratified.
***
Finally, and most remarkably, we now learn that popular sovereignty
apparently can overcome the textual limits on government power but cannot
supply any new ones. This peculiar feature of Ackerman’s theory of regime
change does not emerge until he discusses massive popular resistance to the
Supreme Court’s effort to impose forced busing as a means of integrating public
schools.
In a chapter called “The Switch in Time,” Ackerman chronicles the “popular
mobilization”19 against the Court’s use of forced busing. “Gallup polls were
confirming the hard-liners, showing 76 percent of Americans against busing, only
18 percent in favor. Even blacks were sharply divided.” 20 Without doubt, “the
overwhelming majority of Americans were firmly opposed to the courts’
escalating busing campaign.” 21 Indeed, “anti-busing sentiment was a significant
force behind the tidal wave propelling Nixon to a landslide victory” 22 in 1972.
Ackerman never considers the possibility that this sustained popular and
politically expressed resistance constituted another “constitutional moment” that
established a constitutional line that the federal government cannot cross. Instead,
he claims that “the American people were plainly disengaging from the intense
struggle for black civil rights,” 23 and that the civil rights “issue was returning to
the realm of normal politics, where civil rights advocates no longer could credibly
18

Id. at 313.
Id. at 283.
20
Id. at 263.
21
Id. at 264.
22
Id. at 266.
23
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
19
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claim that the mobilized majority of ordinary Americans were on their side.”24
Just three pages after describing the “popular mobilization” against forced
busing, 25 he characterizes this development as “the inexorable decline of
constitutional mobilization by ordinary Americans.” 26 Rather than conclude that
there arose a “self-conscious” assertion of constitutional limits on the means by
which integration can be achieved, he concludes instead that “[n]o great popular
movement lasts forever” and that the constitutional moment for civil rights had
“come to an end.” 27
These quotes are simply stunning coming from so ardent a proponent of
popular constitutionalism. Ackerman is much too smart to have missed the fact
that he just described in considerable detail—and to his credit as a scholar—a
political tsunami of very engaged American voters opposing forced busing. So his
remarkable description of this intense political mobilization as a “decline of
constitutional motivation” can most charitably be interpreted as revealing his
unstated view that “constitutional moments” only work to overcome textual
restrictions on power, rather than provide new ones. Constitutional moments are
like ratchets, and ratchets only go one way.
Say what you will about the difficulties of Article V, at least it specifies a
mechanism for constitutional change that can work to decrease as well as
increase the power of government.
***
In the end, we are left to ask what the term “constitutional” adds to
Ackerman’s captivating account of the political power that winning social
movements have quite obviously achieved. In what sense are these gains in power
entitled to any additional “legitimacy” beyond the acquiescence that is given to
the positive law? Why don’t these successful assertions of power just have the
political force they have—until they don’t have it anymore? What does
Ackerman’s thesis about “higher-lawmaking” add to that?

24

Id.
Id. at 283. Ackerman refers here to the “popular mobilization against [the Court’s] strong
commitment to integration,” id. (emphasis added), but offers no evidence that this was opposition
to anything other than forced busing.
26
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
27
Id. at 286 (emphasis omitted).
25
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I think I know the answer we are supposed to give to these questions. Once
the limits on constitutional power contained in the written Constitution have been
breached, we are supposed to accept that these limits are now gone forever. They
can never “legitimately” be restored by a differently composed Supreme Court
because the Constitution itself has now informally been “amended” to eliminate
them from the text—the very same way that the Twenty-First Amendment
repealed the Eighteenth. In short, Ackerman seeks for his informal amendments
the same “lock in” that is sought by putting constitutional limits and guarantees in
writing.
Yet, it is one thing to claim, accurately, (a) that the Supreme Court’s
previously existing constitutional law or doctrine provided a legal barrier to a set
of politically popular policies, and (b) that this barrier was eventually overcome
by a complex political process that led the Supreme Court to modify its doctrines
to accommodate these policies. It is quite another to wrap this doctrinal change in
the mantle of “higher law”—as connoted by the terms “super-precedent” and
“super-statutes”—such that a future Supreme Court cannot legitimately confess
error.
No doubt, it might well take a political sea change for a future Court to feel
moved to such a change—perhaps something similar to the intense political
activity that precipitated the judicial departure from its previous doctrine. But
Ackerman wants more than the natural stickiness of established doctrine. He
wants to delegitimate any judicial deviation from the doctrines achieved during
his “constitutional moments” as unconstitutional in the same sense as it would be
unconstitutional for the Court to give California more than two Senators.
Of course, one can object to the very idea of being bound by a written
constitution. 28 But the only serious objection to Article V in particular is that its
procedures make changing our Constitution too hard. This may well be true. For
reasons I have already suggested and will expand upon below, however, the
appropriate solution to this problem is to modify the amendment procedures in
writing.
My difference with Ackerman and the “living constitutionalists” is not about
whether to make the process of amending the Constitution easier, but rather about
whether the text of our written Constitution should be amended informally. After

28

E.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2013) (contending that
the Constitution should be treated as a piece of poetry to liberty and self-government rather than as
binding law).
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all, however “legally” the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment came to be
ratified, both entered the written Constitution in written form.
In this way, there is a sharp discontinuity between the Republican
amendments of the 1860s—as well as the Progressive Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and
Eighteenth amendments of the 1910s—and what transpired during the New Deal
and the Second Reconstruction. An argument for informally ratifying new text
does not, without much more, justify informally ratifying no text at all.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH UNWRITTEN AMENDMENTS TO “THIS CONSTITUTION”
In Part I, I enumerated several advantages to the “formal amendment” 29
process of Article V over Ackerman’s process of informal amendment. But in
advancing these advantages of formalism, I need not to reinvent the wheel. In his
famous 1941 article, Consideration and Form, 30 the renowned Harvard contract
scholar Lon Fuller identified the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions
of formality. Here is how Professors Calamari and Perillo summarized these three
functions, while adding a fourth, the clarifying function:
Formalities serve important functions in many legal systems. . . . Important
among these is the evidentiary function. Compliance with formalities provides
reliable evidence that a given transaction took place. A cautionary function is
also served. . . . Before performing the required ritual the promisor had ample
opportunity to reflect and deliberate on the wisdom of his act. . . . A third
function is an earmarking or channeling function. The populace is made aware
that the use of a given device will attain a desired result. When the device is
used, the judicial task of determining the parties’ intentions is facilitated. A
fourth function is clarification. When the parties reduce their transaction to
writing . . . they are more likely to work out details not contained in their oral
agreement. In addition, form requirements can work to serve regulatory and
fiscal ends, to educate the parties as to the full extent of their obligations, to
provide public notice of the transaction, and also to help management efficiency
31
in an organizational setting.

29

This term appears some twenty times in the book. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 3 (“Americans have occasionally used the formula for formal amendment laid out by the
Founders in Article Five—under which Congress proposes, and state legislatures ratify, changes in
our higher law.”).
30
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
31
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 238 (6th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
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All of these highly practical advantages are lost in a process of informal
amendment of the sort Ackerman advocates. Lost as well is the benefit of having
a written constitution to bind those who are given great power to govern the
people.
But that’s not all. Because the Constitution itself privileges its writtenness,
more would need to be amended than Article V. So too would the oaths of office
for all federal and state officers. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in
Article VI provides that “This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate shall be bound thereby.” 32 “This
Constitution” is obviously a reference to the written Constitution in which the
Supremacy Clause is contained. Article VI then continues by stipulating that:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the
several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the
United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to
support this Constitution.” 33 Again, the oath is to support the written Constitution.
Living constitutionalists like Ackerman think that “the Constitution” is a
broader concept, which may (or may not) include the text of the written
constitution. As explained by Professor David Strauss, Supreme Court
“precedents, traditions, and understandings form an indispensable part of what
might be called our small-c constitution: the constitution as it actually operates, in
practice. That small-c constitution—along with the written Constitution—is our
living Constitution.” 34
But this claim is inconsistent with the text of Article V. The Constitution that
is “the supreme law of the land” to which all federal and state officers swear to
support is “this” one, the written one, not a small-c constitution provided by the
Supreme Court of the United States. This Constitution is the law that governs
those who govern us. And “this Constitution” cannot serve this purpose if those
who are supposed to be governed by it can, on their own, or in combination,
change the rules that apply to them.

32

U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
34
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 35 (2010). Ackerman is not as explicit as
Strauss about this assumption of living constitutionalism. Cf. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 336 (“The Constitution is a work of many generations.” (emphasis added)). Although
this sentence could be limited to subsequent formal amendments, it appears just before a reference
to the “important contributions” of the Second Reconstruction, id., which were not included in the
written Constitution.
33
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Of course, it is true that “this Constitution” does not supply all the information
that is needed to give it legal effect. In addition to constitutional interpretation to
identify the communicative content of “this Constitution,” constitutional
construction is often necessary to apply the communicative content of the text to
particular cases and controversies. 35 So the text itself may sometimes be
supplemented by implementing doctrine that is true to its spirit as well as its
letter.
Ackerman is claiming merely to be supplementing the formal amendment
procedures of Article V, which do not expressly claim to be exclusive of any
other others. To make out this argument, he has appealed to the way that the
Articles of Confederation were superseded by the Constitution without following
the amendment rules therein. But there is an enormous difference between
supplanting a previous regime and professing to amend or modify an existing
regime while remaining within it. Moreover, not only are the amendment
procedures specified in Article V implicitly exclusive, these procedures cannot be
“supplemented” without overriding the passages that make “this Constitution”—
the written one—the “law of the land” and binding by oath on those who are to
govern the People under its authority.
To be clear, I am not making the circular or “bootstrapping” claim that the
text of the Constitution is binding because the text of the Constitution says it is
binding. Rather, I am claiming that those who pledge to be bound by “this
Constitution” are publicly pledging to be bound by “this Constitution,” and “this
Constitution” does not empower them to change it without going through the
procedures of Article V. Like others who believe in the “living constitution,”
Ackerman claims that “We the People” have changed “the Constitution.” He
alludes to “the ongoing conversation that is our Constitution.” 36 But what he
cannot claim is that the People have informally changed “this Constitution.” That
has only been done twenty-seven times.
I deny that the Civil Rights Revolution, as Ackerman so wonderfully
describes it, required a constitutional amendment to achieve. Although I accept
the claim that the New Deal Court deviated from the original meaning of the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses—though never expressly to the
degree claimed by modern progressives—I am unconvinced about the
35

See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453 (2013) (explaining the activity of constitutional construction and how it relates to the
activity of constitutional interpretation).
36
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis added).
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“revolutionary” nature of the Second Reconstruction. True, the requirement of
“state action” that seems to be stipulated in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment 37 was surpassed. But the Equal Protection Clause imposes on state
governments an affirmative duty to provide the “protection of the laws” to all
persons with their jurisdictions and to do so equally. This is a duty that can be
breached by state inaction as well as by state action.
More fundamentally, the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited by the state
action requirement. This was a radical amendment aimed at the heart of the
problems created by at least two hundred years of slavery. 38 If Justice Harlan’s
justly famous dissenting opinions in the Civil Rights Cases 39 and Plessy v.
Ferguson 40 were correct, then there is a lot less to fear from the original meaning
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments than its critics claim.
This is a major claim that I am not in a position to vindicate here. Suffice it to
say that advocates of “living constitutionalism” have an interest in bolstering their
case by exaggerating the extent to which landmark civil rights decisions cannot be
reconciled with the original public meaning of the text. So, for example, while
Michael McConnell’s account of the extent to which Brown was consistent with
the original meaning of the Constitution 41 has not effectively been impeached, 42
neither has it knocked living constitutionalists from their posture of moral
superiority.
Suppose, however, that some now-popular aspects of the civil rights laws of
the twentieth century were unauthorized by the original meaning of the formal
civil rights amendments of the nineteenth. The fact would still remain that none of
these “super-statutes” were sold to the public as amendments or changes to the
written Constitution. Instead, the public was told at the time by these measures’
37

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
38
As Ackerman notes, “Republicans were preparing to use the recently ratified Thirteenth
Amendment as a platform for a series of landmark statutes vindicating the nation’s new
commitment to equality. It was only [President Andrew] Johnson’s repeated vetoes that forced the
Republicans to make the Fourteenth Amendment their 1866 election platform. . . .” ACKERMAN,
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 57-58.
39
109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40
163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995).
42
Compare Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995), with Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist
Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995).
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proponents that they were entirely consistent with both the spirit and letter of the
Constitution.43 Although there were undoubtedly legal academics, and perhaps
some Justices, who believed otherwise, the Court has always denied that any of its
decisions were so in conflict with the text as to constitute an informal
amendment. 44
It is simply too late now to reinterpret the Court’s own jurisprudence after the
fact to support a claim that the People “self-consciously” amended the
Constitution when they merely accepted what they were repeatedly told about the
constitutionality of these results. This Constitution cannot be informally amended
nunc pro tunc. 45
III. THE PROBLEM WITH MAJORITARIAN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Given its lack of conceptual specificity, Ackerman’s project gets its traction
with readers by tapping into their commonly held intuitions of popular consent or
popular sovereignty, by which the “will of the People” is expressed by either a
majority or supermajority of the persons who make up the polity. This, however,
begs the age-old question of what gives some subset of the polity the rightful
power to bind the minority to its commands? In what manner does even a
“mobilized” majority, or supermajority, get to speak on behalf of “We the People”
as a whole?
In my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, I challenge this majoritarian
conception of popular sovereignty as a fiction. Indeed, in my opening chapter,
entitled “The Fiction of ‘We the People’: Is the Constitution Binding on Us?,” I
begin by quoting historian Edmund Morgan:
Government requires make-believe. Make believe that the king is divine, make
believe that he can do no wrong or make believe that the voice of the people is
the voice of God. Make believe that the people have a voice or make believe that
43

See, e.g., WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE
CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW (1937).
44
The case that comes closest to asserting the power to amend due to changed circumstances was
the “Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case” of Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell. 290
U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (“If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.”).
45
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009) (“[Latin ‘now for then’] Having retroactive
legal effect through a court’s inherent power.”).
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the representatives of the people are the people. Make believe that governors are
the servants of the people. Make believe that all men are equal or make believe
that they are not. 46

I then challenged “the idea, sometimes referred to as ‘popular sovereignty,’
that the Constitution of the United States was or is legitimate because it was
established by ‘We the People’ or the ‘consent of the governed.’” 47 I denied “that
the conditions needed to make this claim valid existed at the time the Constitution
was adopted or ever could exist.” 48 Although “‘the People’ can surely be bound
by their consent,” I claimed “this consent must be real, not fictional—unanimous,
not majoritarian. Anything less than unanimous consent simply cannot bind
nonconsenting persons.” 49 Moreover, I contended that “if taken too seriously, the
fiction of ‘We the People’ can prove dangerous in practice and can nurture
unwarranted criticisms of the Constitution’s legitimacy. To understand what
constitutional legitimacy requires, we must first consider what it means to assert
that a constitution is ‘binding.’” 50
Constitutions are not, and do not purport to be, binding on the People
themselves. Instead, they purport to be binding on those who make laws that are
imposed on the People; and it is then claimed that, if a “legitimate” constitution is
followed, the resulting laws will be at least prima facie binding on each person.
Since unanimous consent is taken to be impossible to obtain, 51 how does it come
to pass that a majority or super-majority gets the authority to create a
constitutional regime in which legislation is supposed to be binding on a
dissenting minority?
46

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11
(rev. ed. 2014) (quoting EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13-14 (1988)). Given this statement, it is curious that,
in his cover endorsement of We the People: Foundations, Morgan says that Ackerman’s first
volume “gives pragmatic meaning to government of, by, and for the elusive, invisible, inaudible,
but sovereign people.” In other words, in Morgan’s terms, Ackerman’s book has either
transcended the “make-believe” that “the people have a voice” to identify a genuine popular voice
or, more likely, Morgan views Ackerman’s work as exemplifying the best and highest tradition of
such inevitable make-believe.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
But, as I explain, it is only impossible to obtain unanimous consent to a monopolistic
government governing a geographical territory. Unanimous consent to governance by
nongeographically based authorities is both possible and commonplace. See id. at 39-43.
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In essence, the majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty posits that,
somehow, the minority has consented to be governed by the majority, and they
cannot thereafter complain. Since the express consent of the minority to majority
rule is never solicited, much reliance is placed on the concept of “tacit consent” to
majoritarian rule. In my book, I then debunk each of the stories told to explain
how this tacit consent is obtained based on voting, residence, the consent of the
Founders, and general acquiescence. 52 A theorist, like Bruce Ackerman, who
places all his chips on the concepts of “popular sovereignty” and “popular
consent” really must come to grips with the normative implications of his claims
by specifying precisely who is governing whom, and by what right.
In his first volume, Ackerman described what he called a “dualist” approach
that, in some respects, is superior to more common appeals to majoritarian
popular sovereignty. In contrast with what he calls a “monistic democracy” in
which “[d]emocracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the
winners of the last general election . . . [and] all institutional checks upon the
electoral victors are presumptively antidemocratic,” 53 Ackerman denies that “the
winner of a fair and open election is entitled to rule with the full authority of We
the People.” 54 Instead, he distinguishes “the will of We the People from the acts
of We the Politicians.” 55
Ackerman posits a “dualist” constitution in which normal, validly enacted
legislation is not confused with the “higher lawmaking” that “represents the
constitutional judgment of We the People.” 56 That appellation is limited to
lawmaking initiatives that follow an “arduous obstacle course” 57 designed to
create a “deepening dialogue between leaders and masses within a democratic
structure that finally succeeds in generating broad popular consent for a sharp
break with the status quo.” 58
Ackerman’s dualism represents a refreshing and important improvement over
what we might call the “simple” majoritarian fiction of popular sovereignty. To
the extent that ordinary legislative “will” is decoupled from “We the People,” the
52

See id. at 24. I also critically examine nonconsensual theories of legitimacy. Id. at 25-28.
Because, however, Ackerman is clearly asserting a theory of legitimacy based on popular consent,
my critique of these theories does not apply to him.
53
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 8.
54
Id. at 9.
55
Id. at 10.
56
Id. at 9.
57
Id. at 10.
58
Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Note the reliance here on “popular consent.”
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danger posed by that fiction is greatly reduced. No longer is the process of
systematically checking legislative rule seen as running afoul of the so-called
“countermajoritarian difficulty.” 59
However much might be said for dualism as a descriptive account of how
constitutional doctrine actually changes over time, in We the People:
Transformations, Ackerman made clear that he thinks he has provided “a
normative argument” 60 that rests on the imperative of gaining the “considered
support” of “We the People.” 61 While denying the authority of “the People” to
ordinary legislation, Ackerman ultimately claims that the result of “higher
lawmaking” deserves to be called the will of “We the People.”
In We the People: Foundations, he spoke freely and unselfconsciously of
“principles of higher law validated by the People during their relatively rare
success in constitutional politics” 62 and of “fundamental principles previously
affirmed by the People.” 63 As he summarizes in We the People: The Civil Rights
Revolution:
Higher lawmaking in America is never a matter of a single moment; it is an
extended process, lasting a decade or two, that begins when a leading
governmental institution inaugurates a sustained period of extraordinary political
debate, and it culminates with all three branches generating decisive legal texts
in the name of We the People. 64

He now clearly claims that the amendment procedure of Article V has been “selfconsciously” displaced “with the modern higher lawmaking system based on
landmark statutes and judicial superprecedents.” 65
59

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (noting the judiciary’s role in checking political legislators). See
generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2012) (arguing that the
independent decisionmaking capacity of the Supreme Court has been constrained by the American
public).
60
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 5, at 6 (1998).
61
See id. (describing how dualism “prevents the political elite from undermining the hard-won
achievements of the People . . . and mobilize[s] their considered support before foundational
principles may be revised in a democratic way”).
62
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 21.
63
Id.
64
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added).
65
Id. at 92.
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But all this too is a fiction and, therefore, could not justify a duty of obedience
in the citizenry. Although “the People” can be said to really exist—and can be
characterized as the “sovereign,” as I shall suggest in the next Part—the people as
a whole never speak, never rule, and never validate anything. Only some subset,
whether a majority or minority of the whole, ever vote for or against anything.
Even if those who support some constitutional change can somehow bind
themselves (which I doubt), their votes cannot bind either dissenters or nonvoters.
Consent simply does not work that way. For consent to justify authority, the
person being commanded must himself or herself have consented. In a group of
three people, a majority of two cannot consent for the third, unless the third has
previously designated the other two as her agents. Even then, they cannot violate
her inalienable—i.e., non-transferable—rights. 66
This leaves the normative question of constitutional legitimacy, by which I
mean how individuals come to be bound to obey lawful commands because they
are constitutional. To his credit, Ackerman sees the problem, which he addresses
at the end of Volume One, in a chapter called “Why Dualism?” Indeed, in a
crucial passage, he identified a “good enough” conception of constitutional
legitimacy, which merits reproducing in full:
The ultimate question is not whether this Constitution meets the standards of our highest
moral ideals—no constitution in world history has ever come close—but whether it is
good enough to warrant respectful and conscientious support. “Good enough,” in terms of
the moral quality of its past achievements; “good enough,” in providing reasonable fair
methods for resolving existing disputes; “good enough,” in opening up the future to
popular movements that promise further political growth. If the existing tradition is good
enough along those lines, we will make more progress by building upon it rather than
destroying it. And it seems to me to provide a good enough reason to accept its claim to
legitimacy. 67

I read Volume One before I published Restoring the Lost Constitution, in
which the concept of “good enough” plays a central role in my treatment of
constitutional legitimacy. 68 In my personal copy of We the People: Foundations, I
66

See BARNETT, supra note 46, at 14-24.
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 296-97 (emphasis added).
68
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 46, at 98 (“[W]e may and probably should ignore or disregard a
constitution that is not good enough in what is says to merit respect and adherence.”); id. at 112
(“[W]e are bound by laws passed pursuant to the written Constitution only if what it says
establishes lawmaking procedures that are good enough to impart the benefit of the doubt on the
laws that emerge from the constitutional process.”); id. at 113 (“To repeat, if the original meaning
67
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highlighted the passage above, and underlined the italicized portions of the last
two sentences, while writing in the margin, “basis of legitimacy.” Having
revisited Volume One to prepare this essay, I now suspect that I was influenced
by this passage in ways that went unacknowledged in my later writings, so I am
pleased for the opportunity to acknowledge it now.
Yet whereas Ackerman’s approach to constitutional legitimacy rests on what I
consider to the fiction of consent by “We the People,” let me now sketch another
answer to this question based on a rather different conception of popular
sovereignty that stresses instead the rights retained by the people, which I insist
are quite real.
IV. INDIVIDUAL POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND PRESUMED CONSENT
In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I identify a path to legitimacy in which
laws imposed on nonconsenting persons can be binding in conscience. 69 For the
“consent of the governed” to matter in the first instance, we must assume (and
there is also good reason to conclude 70) that “first come rights, then comes
government.” As the Declaration of Independence stated: “We hold these truths to
be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their
Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.” 71 It then affirmed: “That to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.” 72 It is these “other” natural rights that the Constitution
expressly describes in the Ninth Amendment as “retained by the People.” 73
The assumption that “first come rights, then comes government,” and that the
first duty of government is “to secure” the rights retained by the People, helps
of the Constitution is not ‘good enough,’ then originalism is not warranted because the
Constitution is itself defective and illegitimate. This represents a rejection of the Constitution
itself, not a rejection of originalism per se.”); id. at 322 (“If this original meaning creates a
lawmaking process that is good enough to produce laws that are binding in conscience, then the
original scheme is legitimate.”).
69
See id. at 32-52.
70
See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed.
2014) (providing a normative defense for certain fundamental “natural” rights).
71
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
72
Id. (emphasis added).
73
See BARNETT, supra note 46, at 53-86 (discussing the natural rights “retained by the people” as
liberty rights).
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explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence of consent. For a law
would be just, and therefore binding in conscience, if its restrictions on a citizen’s
freedom were (1) necessary to protect the rights of others, and (2) proper insofar
as they did not violate the preexisting rights of the persons on whom they were
imposed.
The second of these requirements dispenses with the need to obtain the
consent of the person on whom a law is imposed. After all, if a law has not
violated a person’s rights, then that person’s consent is simply not required. The
first requirement supplies the element of obligation. If a law is necessary to
protect the rights of others, then it is obligatory for the person on whom it is
imposed for the same normative reasons that the underlying rights are obligatory.
In this way the pre-existing obligation to respect the rights of others supplies
the duty to obey such a law. Laws can bind in conscience, at least prima facie,
when promulgated by a legal system with procedural assurances that this standard
is likely to be met. A constitution that provides such procedures can be called
“legitimate.” A written constitution that binds lawmakers and law enforcers
bolsters the reliability of these procedures.
In the first edition of Restoring the Lost Constitution, I framed this
nonconsensual source of constitutionality as superior to a majoritarian conception
of popular sovereignty that fictitiously assumes the consent of the minority. Since
it was published, however, I came to learn of an alternative to collective or
majoritarian popular sovereignty that was in existence at the time of the
Founding, a conception of popular sovereignty that is consistent with the
approach to constitutional legitimacy I previously developed. This conception
does not rest on the collective consent of a body of people—which in practice
means consent by a majority of those who are allowed to vote—but is instead
based on the individual sovereignty of each person. 74 This conception of popular
sovereignty, based on the consent of each and every person who is supposed to be
bound by the laws, was most strikingly presented in the first great constitutional
case to be decided by the Supreme Court: Chisholm v. Georgia. 75

74

See id. at 361-69; Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and
Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729 (2007)(describing the conception of individual popular
sovereignty expressed by the justices in Chisholm v. Georgia).
75
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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A. Individual Popular Sovereignty 76
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to one, rejected the state of
Georgia’s assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense against a suit in federal
court for breach of contract brought against it by an individual citizen of another
state. The majority concluded instead that members of the public could sue state
governments because “sovereignty” rests with the people rather than with state
governments. The Justices in Chisholm affirmed that, in America, the states are
not kings, and their legislatures are not the supreme successors to the Crown.
Justice James Wilson began his opinion by stressing that the Constitution
nowhere uses the term “sovereignty.” “To the Constitution of the United States
the term Sovereign, is totally unknown,” he wrote. 77 There was only one place in
the Constitution “where it could have been used with propriety,” he observed,
referring to the Preamble. “But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that
Constitution. They might have announced themselves ‘Sovereign’ people of the
United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious
declaration.” 78
Wilson contended that if the term sovereign is to be used at all it should refer
to the individual person. “[L]aws derived from the pure source of equality and
justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they
require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.”79
In other words, obedience must rest on the consent of the individual person who is
asked to obey the law. Wilson believed that the only reason “a free man is bound
by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which
he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice,
which are formed and authorised by those laws.” 80
For Wilson, then, states were nothing more than an aggregate of free
individuals. “If one free man, an original sovereign,” may bind himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, “why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of
76

An expanded version of the material in this Section and the next will appear in Randy E.
Barnett, The Judicial Duty to Scrutinize Legislation, VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), which was
the basis for my Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence, given at the Valparaiso University School of
Law in October 2013.
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2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted).
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Id.
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Id. at 458 (emphasis omitted and added).
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Id. at 456 (emphasis omitted).
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original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is
undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired.” 81 And he was not
alone in locating sovereignty in the individual person.
In his opinion in Chisholm, Chief Justice John Jay referred tellingly to “the
joint and equal sovereigns of this country.” 82 Jay affirmed the “great and glorious
principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that
fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each
other in their own Courts to have their controversies determined.” 83 Denying
individuals a right to sue a state, while allowing them to sue municipalities,
“would not correspond with the equal rights we claim; with the equality we
profess to admire and maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every
citizen partakes.” 84
Neither Wilson nor Jay’s individualist conception of popular sovereignty
conforms to the modern notion of popular sovereignty as a purely “collective”
concept. Their opinions in Chisholm present the radical yet fundamental idea that
if anyone is sovereign, it is “We the People” as individuals, not Congress, state
legislatures, or a majority of the citizenry.
I am not claiming that Wilson and Jay’s conception of individual popular
sovereignty stood alone at the Founding. Nor am I claiming anything about the
original meaning of the Constitution to which, as Wilson observed, the term
“sovereign” is “totally unknown.” 85 Instead, I offer it to make sense of an
approach to the “consent of the governed” that also existed at the time of the
Founding—an approach that further supports the natural rights conception of
constitutional legitimacy that I summarized above.
If it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and the people as
individuals retain their preexisting rights, as is affirmed in the text of the
Constitution by the Ninth Amendment, 86 and if it is the case that the existing
81

Id. (emphasis added and omitted).
Id. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
84
Id. at 473.
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Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted).
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See generally, Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a TextualHistorical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008) (rejecting a “collectivist”
interpretation of the “rights . . . retained by the people” to which the Ninth Amendment refers);
Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX L. REV. 1 (2006) (“[T]he
Ninth Amendment is what it appears to be: a meaningful check on federal power and a significant
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government lacks the express consent of every person, then we are faced with the
issue of what the people could have consented to. Put another way, to the extent
any government claims to be based on the consent of the governed without
obtaining each person’s express consent, we need to ask to what each person
could be said to have consented.
B. Presumed Consent
How then do we reconcile the individual conception of popular sovereignty
based on the consent of each and every person with the fact that such unanimous
consent to governance is never expressly solicited and would be impossible to
obtain? As it happens, there is an oft-overlooked answer to this question that can
be found at the time of the Founding and long before. If we start with the
proposition that it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and that they
retain their preexisting rights unless they are expressly delegated to their agents,
then in the absence of such express consent, we must ask to what each person
could be presumed to have consented.
In his 1845 book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Lysander Spooner
contended that, since the consent of the governed “exists only in theory,” 87 the
people cannot be presumed to have given up their preexisting rights. “Justice is
evidently the only principle that everybody can be presumed to agree to, in the
formation of government.” 88 But Spooner was far from the first to make this
argument.
John Locke, in his Second Treatise, observed that “men when they enter into
Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they had in the State
of Nature, into the hands of the Society, to be so far disposed of by the
Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require.” 89 He then considered the
scope of the legislative or police power that is given up, employing an analysis
very similar to Spooner’s:
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LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 153 (Boston, Marsh 1845).
(“Our constitutions purport to be established by ‘the people,’ and in theory, ‘all the people’
consent to such government as the constitutions authorize. But this consent of ‘the people’ exists
only in theory. It has no existence in fact.”).
88
Id. at 143.
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JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
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[Y]et it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the
power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be
suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to
secure every ones [sic] Property, by providing against those three defects
. . . that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie [sic].90

Like Spooner, Locke asked what a “rational creature can be supposed” to have
consented to, in the absence of any explicit consent, when leaving the state of
nature to enter civil society. And the individual can only be supposed to have
consented to the common good, which consists of the protection of each person’s
life, liberty, and property.
This idea of “supposed” or presumed consent appears again in Attorney
General Edmund Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank.
In addressing whether the power to incorporate a national bank is among the
implied powers of Congress, Randolph observed that a legislature governed by a
written constitution without an express “demarcation of powers, may, perhaps, be
presumed to be left at large, as to all authority which is communicable by the
people,” provided that such authority “does not affect any of those paramount
rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their
representatives.” 91 Once again, given the sovereignty of the people as individuals,
the people cannot “be presumed” or “supposed” to have confided in their
legislature any power to violate their fundamental rights.
But perhaps the most striking use of this notion of the presumed or supposed
consent of the governed appears in the 1798 Supreme Court case of Calder v.
Bull. Calder has become known for its clash between Justices Samuel Chase and
James Iredell. Chase’s opinion is famous for its assertion of “the great first
principles of the social compact” that restrict the “rightful exercise of legislative
authority,” 92 and Iredell’s for its far grander conception of legislative power in the
90

Id. (emphasis omitted and added). The “three defects” to which Locke refers are the absence of
standing laws, the want of an effective power to protect one’s rights, and the lack of an
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by the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government.
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absence of any express constitutional limit. Generally overlooked is the fact that,
like Locke, Randolph, and Spooner, Chase too employs the notion of supposed or
presumed consent.
Justice Chase begins by providing examples of laws that violate these “great
first principles,” such as a law “that punished a citizen for an innocent action,” or
“a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens,” or “a law
that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A.
and gives it to B.” He then contends that the enactment of such laws is beyond the
legislative power because “it is against all reason and justice, for a people to
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it.” 93
To be sure, the concept of natural justice or natural rights lurks in the
background of all these considerations of “presumed consent,” but only as a way
of interpreting the scope of legislative power in the absence of an express consent.
When combined with the concept of individual popular sovereignty, all these
invocations of “presumed,” “supposed,” or “theoretical” consent cast the issue of
popular sovereignty and the “consent of the governed” in a new light that supports
the approach to constitutional legitimacy I present in Restoring the Lost
Constitution.
We can separate the steps of this argument as follows:
•
•
•

•
•

93

First, sovereignty rests not in the government, but in the people
themselves considered as individuals;
Second, to be legitimate, the government must receive the consent
of all these sovereign individuals;
Third, in the absence of express consent by each person, however,
the only consent that can be attributed to everyone is consent only
to such powers that do not violate their retained fundamental
rights;
Fourth, protecting these rights retained by the people assures that
the government actually conforms to the consent it claims as the
source of its just powers; finally
Fifth, only if such protection is effective will its commands bind in
conscience on the individual.

Id. (emphasis added).
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V. RECONCEIVING ARTICLE V AS A CHECK ON THE GOVERNORS
If sovereignty resides in each and every individual person, then two
propositions follow:
• The sovereign people themselves never rule.
• But the sovereign people always require effective protection from
those who do.
The only way to justify rule by some subset of the sovereign people—whether a
supermajority, simple majority, majority of a group of “legislators,” or a king and
his court—is by providing effective assurance that the measures the rulers impose
on the people as a whole do not violate the rights retained by any person or group
of persons.
In short, given the ultimate sovereignty of the people, majorities and supermajorities are not the solutions to the problem of constitutional legitimacy; in a
republican form of government, they are the problem to be solved. James
Madison explained this quite clearly:
But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the
United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in
the Legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled
against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses
the highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or
Legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating
94
by the majority against the minority.

In Federalist No. 10, Madison famously contended that the rights retained by
the people are at risk from factions, be they a minority or majority of the whole.
“By a faction,” he wrote, “I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” 95
Ackerman has shown how a concerted “mobilized” majority can overcome the
structural and textual barriers on the powers of Congress contained in the
Constitution. However, he has not addressed why we should believe that the
triumph of this mobilized majority is always, or even usually, for the best.
94

1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 437 (photo. reprint
2003) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
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Perhaps the ends were salutary, but were the means by which they were achieved
dangerous to the rights of the minority? That question generally goes unasked,
much less answered, in the We the People series.
True, in Volume One, Ackerman reproduces a lengthy quotation from
Alexander Hamilton, writing as “Publius,” on the need for judicial review to
protect the “rights of individuals” and to guard against the “serious oppressions of
the minor party in the community.”
[The] independence of the judge is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate
reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. 96

And he also includes this passage from Hamilton on how the Constitution is to be
properly changed:
Until the people by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually;
and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their
representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act. 97

Seemingly accepting the need for this judicial fidelity to the written
Constitution, Ackerman responds that Hamilton “does not say that the judges
should resist until the transformative movement satisfies all the legal rules for
constitutional amendment that are contained in his new Constitution.”98 Rather,
he “leaves open the relationship between these new rules and the kinds of ‘solemn
and authoritative’ action that should convince the judges.” 99 Really?
I confess this strikes me as an informal amendment of what Publius is actually
saying, one that elides the fundamental difference between extra-legal regime
change and modifications of the existing regime, which I discussed at the
beginning of this essay. Be this as it may, when invoking Hamilton’s assertion of
judicial fidelity to the written Constitution as the guardian of individual rights and
96

ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 193 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
97
Id. (quoting same).
98
Id. at 195.
99
Id.
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the interests of minorities, Ackerman undermines this protection by expanding the
ways a concerted majority can overcome the constitutional constraints upon it
without addressing the impact for individual rights of this expanded assertion of
majoritarian power.
Just before the lengthy passage from The Federalist No. 78 that Ackerman
quotes, Hamilton affirms that “the courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments.” 100 Yet, put
simply, the entire object of these three volumes is to legitimize permanent judicial
acquiescence to assertions of congressional power that exceed the textual limits of
the written Constitution, either by claiming the existence of a constitutional
“revolution” or an informal constitutional “amendment” by “We the People.”
None of his case for such change addresses the concerns for individual rights or
the rights of the minority that a written constitution is enacted to protect and that
Hamilton says the independent judiciary is tasked with enforcing.
Nor can Ackerman defend his informal amendment process as merely
providing an alternative appeal to “the solemn and authoritative” judgment of “the
people themselves” that is provided by the written Constitution itself. After all,
Article V does not purport to appeal to “We the People.” Instead it provides two
alternative ways by which amendments proposed by a supermajority of Congress
(or state conventions) can be ratified: by a supermajority of three-quarters of state
legislatures, or by three-quarters of state conventions. Only the latter can be
conceived, somewhat fictitiously, as the voice of the people themselves. 101
Although the Constitution itself was submitted for ratification to conventions in
each of the states, the Constitution can be amended by a combination of Congress
and state legislatures, not the people themselves.
Viewed in this light, Article V is not a way for the people “to speak.”102
Instead it can be more realistically viewed as yet another prudential “check” on
government power, by recognizing a power in a different subset of the people than
the one seeking to expand or modify its grant of power. If a written constitution
provides the laws that govern those who govern the sovereign people, then the
100

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
101
See MORGAN, supra note 46, at 91 (“[T]he idea of an elected convention that would express
enduring popular will in fundamental constitutions superior to government was a viable way of
making popular creation and limitation of government believable.”).
102
Cf. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 329 (“Scalia and Thomas suppose that Article
V provides the only way that We the People can speak, and I reject their hyper-formalism as
historically unjustified.”).
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governors cannot on their own—even in combination with each other—safely be
entrusted with the power to change the rules by which they govern the people.
That power of change must reside in some other hopefully competitive body, like
those of elected state legislators.
Ackerman’s informal amendment procedures simply cannot claim greater
legitimacy than the Article V procedures he seeks to supplement. Indeed, to
override Article V’s countermajoritarian constraint on the will of the majority of
the People, Ackerman appeals to the majority itself. In this, he misconceives the
nature of popular sovereignty that includes each and every fellow citizen and
joint-sovereign, and the purpose and function of Article V in safeguarding that
sovereignty.
This is not to say that Article V may not make amending the Constitution too
difficult, which it may well do. But however the amendment process should be
reformed, any new procedures should be debated and then implemented openly by
means of a written text that, like the existing Article V, satisfies the evidentiary,
cautionary, channeling and clarifying functions of formality. 103
CONCLUSION
In his series of fascinating and learned books, Bruce Ackerman has claimed
that “We the People” are the sovereign. On that we can agree. He also claims that
“We the People” can legitimately rule by speaking informally in the various ways
he takes pains to describe. But this normative claim is not clearly specified, and is
subject to several fundamental criticisms. It fails to appreciate the protection
afforded to the rights retained by the people by formal constraints on powers. And
it fails to offer any normative justification for rule by a politically mobilized
faction. Upon closer inspection, Ackerman fails to present or sustain a normative
argument for why a supermajority can legitimately override the text of the written
Constitution that was put in place to protect We the People, each and every one.
POSTSCRIPT
In his remarks for this symposium, Professor Ackerman graciously responded
to some of the criticisms of his project I make here, as well as offering his own
criticisms of the conception of individual popular sovereignty and presumed
consent that I propose. Ackerman writes:
103
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Professor Barnett’s appeal to Chisholm is flatly inconsistent with his originalist
commitment to textualism. However inspiring he may find the opinions of Jay and
Wilson, Americans of the Founding era emphatically disagreed. It took them only one
year to mobilize in Congress and the states to enact the Eleventh Amendment which
repudiated Chisholm and propelled the Constitution in a different direction….
Interpreting popular sovereignty on the basis of Chisholm is like interpreting citizenship
on the basis of Dred Scott. Professor Barnett must choose: either he is a textual originalist
or he is an advocate of social contract theory. But not both. 104

In his reply to critics, Professor Ackerman rightly emphasizes that some of the
criticisms advanced against his latest book were addressed in earlier volumes. In
my discussion of Chisholm above, I similarly neglected to refer the reader to
where I had previously considered and rejected the claim that the Eleventh
Amendment “repudiated” the individualist conception of popular sovereignty
articulated in Chisholm. 105 In this Addendum, I do not present a full defense of
my views, but seek instead to clarify just two points: (1) the Eleventh
Amendment’s relationship to Chisholm, and (2) the relationship of my invocation
of individual popular sovereignty to originalism.
DID THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT “REPUDIATE” CHISHOLM?
By invoking the Eleventh Amendment in response to my discussion of the
conception of popular sovereignty in Chisholm, Ackerman has waded into deep
and treacherous waters. In his reply, Ackerman is claiming that the highly
technical language of the Eleventh Amendment construing Article III’s state
citizen diversity106 should be read as a repudiation of the idea expressed in
Chisholm that the people as individuals are sovereign. He offers no evidence
whatsoever that the Amendment was so read at the time, and this reading of the
text itself is so implausible as to border on absurdity. Indeed, if the Eleventh
Amendment’s partial protection of state immunity from lawsuits in federal court
really did replace the sovereignty of We the People with a state-based conception
of sovereignty, the implications for Ackerman’s own theory would be devastating.
104

Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, __ YALE L. J. ___ (20134).
See Barnett, supra note 74, at 1741-55 (discussing “why the Eleventh Amendment did not
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Subtleties matter when considering the relationship of the Eleventh
Amendment to the justice’s seriatim opinions Chisholm. For a start, we must
carefully distinguish between two distinct positions. The first is the claim that the
Court in Chisholm had incorrectly interpreted the original meaning of Article III
and that, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment restored that original meaning. The
second is that Chisholm was a correct interpretation of Article III and that,
therefore, the Eleventh Amendment changed or qualified that original meaning.
Ackerman is unclear whether he thinks the Eleventh Amendment changed or
restored the original meaning of the text: “It took [Americans of the Founding
era] only one year to mobilize in Congress and the states to enact the Eleventh
Amendment which repudiated Chisholm and propelled the Constitution in a
different direction.” 107 Does this mean that the Eleventh Amendment took the
Constitution in a different direction (change), or that the Eleventh Amendment
took “the Constitution” of the Supreme Court in a different direction
(restoration)? He does not say which. At moments like this, it is useful to be able
to distinguish the meaning of “the Constitution” itself from the constitutional law
of the Supreme Court, but Ackerman’s project elides this distinction, and here it
shows.
Then there is a second subtlety: Whether it was a restoration or a modification
of the original meaning of Article III, did the original meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment “repudiate” the principle of individual popular sovereignty
announced in Chisholm in favor of a general unwritten principle of state
sovereignty or, perhaps more narrowly, state sovereign immunity? Or did it
instead merely do what it says and nothing more: insulate a state from suits in
federal court by citizens of other states and of foreign nations. While the latter, far
narrower, proposition has been endorsed by a broad swath of ideologically and
methodologically diverse Eleventh Amendment scholars, 108Ackerman is
apparently endorsing the first of these readings.
107
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As it happens, however, Chief Justice John Marshall did not agree. In a littlenoted passage of his opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 109 some twenty years after the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, he observed: “The Constitution, as passed,
gave the courts of the United States jurisdiction in suits brought against individual
States. A State, then, which violated its own contract was suable in the courts of
the United States for that violation.” 110 Marshall then concluded that, although
“this feature is no longer found in the Constitution,” it nevertheless still “aids in
the construction of those clauses with which it was originally associated.” 111 In
other words, according to John Marshall, Chisholm was a faithful interpretation of
the original meaning of the Constitution at the time it was decided, and remained
a correct reading of the general principles of our political institutions even after
the text was amended to carve out a limited immunity for states.
Given that Ackerman plays the Dred Scott card, 112 it is ironic that he endorses
the reading of the Eleventh Amendment that was first adopted by the same
shameful post-Reconstruction Supreme Court that gutted the Republican’s
revolutionary formal amendments. For it was not until the 1890 case of Hans v.
Louisiana, 113 decided just six years before Plessy v. Ferguson, 114 that the
Supreme Court first took the position that the Eleventh Amendment had
repudiated its own decision in Chisholm. Like Ackerman, the Court in Hans
asserted that the views of state sovereignty articulated by Justice Iredell in his
solo dissent in Chisholm “were clearly right,—as the people of the United States

Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 953, 1010 (2000) (arguing that “sovereign immunity is in some respects unjust”
and “the Eleventh Amendment need not be understood to have endorsed that injustice as a general
proposition”); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (arguing that the Amendment represented
a compromise on fiscal policy between the states and the federal government).
109
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
110
Id. at 139 (emphases added).
111
Id. (emphasis added).
112
See Ackerman, supra note 104, at __. See also id. at __ (“There are only two other times in
American history when a Supreme Court judgment has been self-consciously repudiated by formal
amendment: the Fourteenth rejected Dred Scott; the Sixteenth, the Income Tax Cases. Interpreting
popular sovereignty on the basis of Chisholm is like interpreting citizenship on the basis of Dred
Scott.”).
113
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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in their sovereign capacity subsequently decided” 115 when it enacted the Eleventh
Amendment.
This position was then reaffirmed and extended by the Rehnquist Court in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.116 In his opinion in Seminole Tribe, Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted Hans with approval: “Although the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” 117 Like
Ackerman, Chief Justice Rehnquist excoriated the dissent for “relying upon the
now-discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.” 118
Not only does the text itself not support the conclusion that the Eleventh
Amendment repudiated Chisholm’s view of popular sovereignty, to reach its
conclusion, the Supreme Court needed to reject arguments based on the text:
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed
at a straw man—we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the
Eleventh Amendment is [quoting Hans] “to strain the Constitution and the law
to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.” The text dealt in terms only
with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm.... 119

The Court’s modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine, seemingly endorsed by
Ackerman as the original meaning of the Constitution, rests not on the “literal”
text of the Amendment, but rather on what the Court claims to be its unwritten
underlying “presupposition.” 120
To establish this unwritten principle, the Court in both Hans and Seminole
115
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by the Eleventh Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative of immunity.”).
Seminole Tribe reversed Union Gas. See Seminole Tribe, at 517 U.S. at 66 (“We feel bound to
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Tribe employed the now-generally-rejected approach to originalism that is based
on the original intentions of the framers or ratifiers, rather than upon the original
public meaning of the text that was adopted. 121 Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans
exemplifies a typical feature of original intent Proto-Originalism: its reliance on
the counterfactual hypothetical intentions of the framers rather than on historical
evidence of textual meaning.
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to
be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own State in the federal courts, whilst the
idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States can we
imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face. 122

Even before I was an originalist, I dubbed this technique, “channeling” the
framers. 123
Which leads to a second irony of Professor Ackerman’s invocation of Dred
Scott. By appealing to the principles, “presuppositions” or “postulates” allegedly
held by the relevant drafters or ratifiers to override the public meaning of the text
itself, the Court in Hans employed the same type of hypothetical original intent
reasoning used by Justice Taney in Dred Scott when he interpreted the meaning of
“the People” in the Preamble and in the Declaration of Independence.
It cannot be supposed that [the State sovereignties] intended to secure to [free blacks]
rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the Union, which
every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. More especially, it
cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the
word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to
receive them in that character from another State. 124
121
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This use of hypothetical original intent to narrow the meaning of the text of the
Reconstruction Amendments later became a favorite technique of the
Reconstruction Era Supreme Court, beginning as early as The Slaughter-House
Cases. 125
WHY I WAS NOT MAKING AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT ABOUT POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY
Regardless of whether the individualist conception of popular sovereignty
expressed by Justices Jay and Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia was somehow
repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment, by invoking their opinions I was not
myself making an originalist argument. That is, I was not claiming that the
individualist conception of popular sovereignty was somehow to be found in the
communicative content of the text of the Constitution. Instead, I was making a
normative argument about the conditions of establishing constitutional legitimacy.
Or, more precisely, I was responding to the implicit normative argument made by
Ackerman when he invokes the higher-lawmaking power of a super-majority of
“We the People.”
Rather than alleging the consent of majorities, super-majorities or states, I
proposed using the “presumed consent” of individuals to reconcile the assertion in
the Declaration of Independence that governments are instituted “to secure these”
pre-existing individual, natural, and inalienable rights retained by the people with
its assertion that such governments “deriv[e] their just powers” from “the consent
of the governed.” 126 The individualist conception of popular sovereignty
articulated by Jay and Wilson reduces the tension between these two claims in a
manner that today’s exclusive focus on collective popular sovereignty conceals.
I then proposed that—as explained by Justice Chase in Calder, as well as by
Locke and Edmond Randolph 127—there are legislative powers to which it cannot
be presumed that each and every person has consented, even if a majority or
supermajority of the people so approve. The existence of the individual natural
and inalienable rights retained by the people undercuts any claim that “the
People,” considered as individuals, impliedly consented to a legislative power to
violate these rights.
125
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But this is not an originalist argument. This is an argument about how to
construe the scope of nontextual constitutional powers in a way that enhances
constitutional legitimacy, by which I mean whether laws that are imposed on a
nonconsenting individual by a given constitutional order are binding in
conscience on that individual. 128 It would be bootstrapping to claim that the
constitutional order established by the founders’ Constitution was legitimate
because it comported with the founders’ own conception of legitimacy based on
their allegedly collective conception of popular sovereignty.
It is true that, for over twenty-five years and beginning well before I myself
was an originalist, I have contended that the original meaning of the
“rights...retained by the people” 129 in the Ninth Amendment was a reference to
individual, natural, liberty rights and that, as a matter of positive constitutional
law, such rights should not be denied or disparaged. 130 But, while the normative
claim that the legal order established by the Constitution is (or is not) legitimate
must begin with its positive meaning, which I maintain is its original meaning, it
cannot end there. In short, I never naively “base [my] preference for Locke simply
because [sic] his Second Treatise influenced some leading Founders.” 131
For this reason, Ackerman’s characterization of my position as a “rejection of
originalism” 132 is a gross distortion. Unsurprisingly, I remain fully committed to
originalism but argue, as I always have, for the legitimacy of the originalist
constitutional order on normative grounds. The opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia
demonstrate that individual popular sovereignty is deeply rooted in our
constitutional tradition, but the normative legitimacy of the constitutional order
must be supported by reasons that we can affirm here and now.
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As I have written, “if the original meaning of the Constitution is not ‘good
enough,’ then originalism is not warranted because the Constitution is itself
defective and illegitimate. This represents a rejection of the Constitution, not a
rejection of originalism per se.” 133 At the same time, I also insisted that “[s]hort of
making the claim of illegitimacy, however, we are bound to respect the original
meaning of a text, not by the dead hand of the past, but because we today—right
here, right now—profess our commitment to this written Constitution, and
original meaning interpretation follows naturally from this commitment.” 134
Nor do I offer a social contractarian normative defense of the natural rights
retained by the people. Instead, I defend them at length on the ground that they
are necessary to address the fundamental social problems of knowledge, interest,
and power—problems that must somehow be addressed if persons are to pursue
happiness while living in society with each other. 135 My use of “contractarian”
here and elsewhere reasoning is simply responsive to the commonplace claim that
“the People” have somehow collectively, via a majoritarian decision-making
process, “consented” to bind everyone. 136 To this, I reply, “not so fast.”
Indeed, it appears to be Ackerman who is invoking the authority of the
founders to establish the legitimacy of his collective conception of popular
sovereignty. “Once Professor Barnett abandons his ahistorical appeal to John
Locke,” he chides, “his commitment to the original understanding requires him to
consider whether my blow-by-blow description of these the latter-day
transformations satisfy the principles of popular sovereignty established at the
Founding.” 137
Ackerman is right that my “appeal to John Locke” is “ahistorical” insofar as a
Lockean conception of natural rights (among others) contributes to our normative
assessment of the legitimacy of the Constitution. 138 But what Ackerman then
133
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dismisses as “our philosophical disagreement” 139 about the normative legitimacy
of the constitution simply cannot be obviated by appeals to history. At some
point, constitutional theorists who make claims about constitutional legitimacy
must either offer cogent normative arguments, which I acknowledge is
demanding, or at least candidly admit their normative assumptions for their
audience to judge.
In the end, in his monumental “We the People” series of books, Ackerman
may or may not be describing accurately the positive constitutional law of
informal constitutional change outside of Article V. For reasons given above, I
say “nay.” But even Bruce Ackerman cannot derive a normative “ought” from an
historical “is,” no matter how many volumes he writes.
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